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Abstract 
In the Olympic Games, professional athletes representing their nations compete regardless of economic, political 
and cultural differences. In this study, we apply gravity model to observe characteristics, represented by ‘distances’ 
among nations that directly compete against one another in the Summer Olympics. We use dyadic data consisting 
of medal winning nations in the Olympic Games from 1952 to 2016. To compare how the dynamics changed 
during and after the Cold War period, we partitioned our data into two time periods (1952–1988 and 1992–2016). 
Our research is distinguishable from previous studies in that we newly introduce application of gravity model in 
observing the dynamics of the Olympic Games. Our results show that for the entire study period, countries that 
engaged each other in competition in the finals of an Olympic event tend to be similar in economic size. After the 
Cold War, country pairs that compete more frequently tend to be similar in genetic origin.  
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1. Introduction 
Athletes who represent diverse nations compete fiercely in the Olympic Games. The 
significance of winning a medal at the Olympic Games goes beyond individual achievement; 
it is also a triumph for the countries that the athletes represent [1]. The Olympic Games, in 
which many nations around the world participate regardless of differing political ideologies, 
cultural practices and economic status, is one of the few international competitions held 
consistently despite the geopolitical circumstances of the time. It affords us a unique 
opportunity to examine dynamics between competing nations during and after the Cold War.  
The results of the Olympics are analysed in diverse disciplines. In studies of economic 
resources and the Olympic Games, the focus is mainly on relations between economic 
resources and medal totals [2]–[8]. In another literature in measuring the host effect of the 
Olympics, which is coined as the ‘Olympic effect’, uses gravity model to analyse the host 
country advantage in terms of exports [9].  
In this study, we apply the gravity model to unveil the embedded patterns that 
competing nations have in the Olympic Games. Using the Olympic Games data, we herein 
focus on the relations between nations that actually competed against one another in the 
Olympic Games. From the gravity model, we adopt the notion of the mass and distances. As 
much as the total population is one of the most important factors that determines Olympic 
participation [2, 3] and that it is commonly used to represent the mass in literatures [10, 11], 
we use total population of any two competing nations as the mass. We address the question of 
who competes against whom in the Olympic Games, observing similarities between countries 
that directly compete against one another in the Olympic Games. In our case, we observe 
similarities in terms of GDP per capita and genetic origin which are introduced as distances. 
Our approach to this matter is to focus on pairwise competition between nations that actually 
competed at the individual event level in every Summer Olympic Games since 1952.  
In section 2, we present operationalization of our data using bipartite network 
projection. Then we explain our network-based approach as well as theoretical background and 
its applications of the gravity model, which derived from Newton’s law of gravitation. In 
section 3, we move towards our analysis, which consists of two main parts. First, we take 
network-based approach by utilizing maximum spanning trees (MST) algorithm to create a 
general topological overview of the Olympic network. Then, we conduct a modularity Q test 
to observe community cohesion by continent, in terms of polity, GDP and population. These 
two procedures justify the use of the gravity model-based analysis. In the second part of our 
analysis, we conduct a PPML regression analysis using the gravity model with data from 1952 
to the recent 2016 Rio Olympic Games. Last section includes discussions of our findings and 
implications.  
 
2. Methodology and data 
2.1. Bipartite projection 
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For each Olympic game held since 1952, we obtained a list of medalist nations for 
each event-gender of the Olympic Games during our study period. In classifying each event of 
the Games, there are several hierarchical categories that each event belongs to; sport (e.g. 
aquatics) as the largest category and discipline (e.g. swimming), event (e.g.  200m freestyle) 
and event-gender (e.g. 200m freestyle - male) as the descending categories. For each event-
gender of each Olympic game, we made bipartite projection. The yellow and blue nodes in Fig. 
1A represents event at the gender level and medalists countries respectively for each Olympic 
game. Links are made between two sets of nodes of those who won a medal, regardless of the 
medal colors. The focus in our study lies with the mere fact that countries competed against 
one another. Therefore, we did not take into consideration of medal colours. Next, as illustrated 
in Fig 1B, we projected our bipartite network of Fig. 1A into one-mode network by countries, 
where two country nodes are connected if they share at least one sport event node.  
We excluded self-loops in our one-mode network because the focus of our analysis is 
to observe the relationships between different nations, not within nations. Links in our network 
represents the frequencies of competition between two nations. The thickness of the links 
accounts for weights, representing summed encounter frequencies of two nations for each 
Olympic Game. We did not take into consideration differences in the format of each event. 
Some sports, such as judo and table tennis, involve single elimination competition, while 
basketball and softball follow the “three-up, three-count” format. We assumed that medalist 
nations directly competed against one another if they received medals from the same event.  
We excluded following data from our dataset. First, we excluded data from the 1980 
and 1984 Olympic Games due to the bias coming from these two Games. It was clear that the 
major boycott by the U.S. and its 65 allies of the 1980 Moscow Olympics and the retaliatory 
boycott by the Eastern bloc of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics during the Cold War period 
would cause biased results. Second, we excluded Olympic teams that do not represent a specific 
nation, such as the IOA (Independent/Individual Olympic Athletes) and EUN (Unified Team) 
because the level of analysis in this research is limited to nations. Likewise, we excluded 
unified teams where two nations competed as a single team during the Cold War period, such 
as the United Team of Germany (EUA).  
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2.2. Network Topology 
 To show topological overviews of pairwise competition between nations, we use the 
Minimum Spanning Tree (MST) algorithm [12]. Although the MST method is useful for 
visualizing the basic structure of a network topology [13], some important links may be 
eliminated in the process, which may serve as a critical link in interpreting the network topology. 
Therefore, to avoid the potential problem that comes from MST algorithm, we also use 
modularity Q with the original network to detect cluster cohesion. Modularity Q is used to 
measure the structure of the network to observe how the network can be divided into modules, 
or clusters. If the modules are well divided into clusters, then the network is considered to have 
dense connections among the nodes within the cluster, while it has low connections between 
different clusters[14]. For both MST and modularity, we added node attributes such as 
Figure 1. Example of bipartite network projection of Olympic data. (A) Bipartite 
network of two sets of nodes, event-gender (yellow) and countries (blue). (B) 
Projected network by country nodes. The thickness of links represents competition 
frequency. In this example network, country B and C engaged in 6 competitions.  
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population, economy size, polity level and geographical continents of countries.  
 Our sample for network-based analysis consists of nations and their competing 
relations, represented as nodes and links, respectively. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for 
Olympics network. The number of nodes and links generally increases over time observed. In 
1952, there are 43 countries (nodes) that won a medal in the Olympics, while there are 86 
countries in 2016 Rio Olympics. Although the number of nodes increases by two-folds, and 
links by approximately 2.7 folds, average degree remains similar. Given that there is an average 
of three medals per event, it is understandable that the density of the nodes remains similar.  
 
Table 1. Data composition of Olympic network 
Year Host city Number of nodes 
Number of 
links 
Average 
degree 
1952 Helsinki 43 184 8.56 
1956 Melbourne 37 139 7.51 
1960 Rome 43 137 6.37 
1964 Tokyo 40 145 7.25 
1968 Mexico City 44 163 7.41 
1972 Munich 48 168 7.00 
1976 Montreal 41 192 9.37 
1988 Seoul 49 229 9.35 
1992 Barcelona 62 288 9.30 
1996 Atlanta 79 406 8.84 
2000 Sydney 80 444 9.27 
2004 Athens 74 444 9.27 
2008 Beijing 85 453 8.46 
2012 London 85 462 9.27 
2016 Rio de Janeiro 86 509 9.10 
 
2.3. Gravity model 
The gravity model originated from Newton’s law of universal gravitation. The law 
articulates that all forms of matter in the universe are attracted to each other through the force 
of gravity. It is represented as follows: F = G$%$&'&                     (1) 
The force between two objects, represented by F, is proportional to the product of the 
two masses, 𝑚) and 𝑚*, and inversely proportional to the square of the distance, r, between 
the two masses. This law of physics has also been applied to interpret social phenomena. For 
example, economists have applied the gravity model to measure bilateral trade flows based on 
the relative economic sizes and distance between nations [14-17]. 
The most widely used gravity model in international economics takes the following 
form[18]: 
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    𝑇-. = 𝛽0𝑌-2%𝑌.2&𝐷-.24𝜂-. ,    (2) 
where T denotes trade flows between countries i and j; Y represents the economic masses of 
countries i and j; D denotes distances between countries i and j; 𝛼0, 𝛼), 𝛼*, 𝛼7 are coefficients 
of each parameter; and 𝜂-.  is an error term. The gravity model for trade predicates that trade 
flows between countries i and j are proportional to the product of the sizes of the economies of 
the two countries, normally measured by their GDP, and inversely proportional to the distance 
between them. Distance is not limited to geographical distance between the two countries; it 
may potentially encompass all factors that may cause trade friction between two nations[19]. 
To measure the parameters of interest by least squares estimation, we follow the long tradition 
in international economics research of log-linearizing equation (2) to derive equation (3), as 
follows: 
  ln 𝑇-. = ln𝛽0 + 𝛽) ln 𝑌- + 𝛽* ln 𝑌. − 𝛽7 ln𝐷-. + ln 𝜂-.   (3) 
Use of equation (3) in the gravity model framework is not limited to international 
economics research; it has also been widely used in different disciplines to study phenomena 
such as migration [19, 20], tourism [21, 22], patenting behaviour [23, 24], international arms 
transfers [26], and transportation [12, 26] to explain certain behaviours or characteristics 
affecting their respective flows. We use the applied gravity model to observe similarities among 
countries that engage in direct competition at the Olympic Games. There are links that can be 
defined by political or social phenomena, rather than geographical distance [27]; thus, we 
extend the notion of distance to encompass non-geographical distances in our model, such as 
economic and genetic distances. Also, our analysis includes other distance variables to control 
for factors that may affect the Olympic Games, such as linguistics and geographical proximity. 
To solve the problems arising from the presence of heteroscedasticity under the non-linear 
gravity model, we use Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML), which provides 
consistent estimates of the original non-linear model [18]. Use of the Poisson regression 
method results in a log-linear model; it also aids in avoiding underprediction of the estimates 
[19]. 
The gravity model of dyadic Olympic competition is specified as follows: 𝑊-.= = 	𝑙𝑛𝛼0 	+ 𝛽)ln	(POP-= × 𝑃𝑂𝑃.=) +	𝛽*𝑙𝑛GDPpc-.= + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛GEO-. + 𝛽L𝑙𝑛GENE-. +	𝛽N𝑙𝑛LANG-. + 𝛿)𝑙𝑛POLITY-.= + 𝛿*COLONY-.= + 𝛿7ALLIANCE-.= + 𝛿LHOST-.= + 𝜀-.=    (4) 
where the dependent variable, W for weight, represents the frequency of competition between 
countries i and j during year t. Since the nature of Olympic competition does not allow 
differentiation between home and destination countries, it is impossible to estimate the 
coefficients of the origin and destination variables separately. As a solution, we used the 
product of the populations of any two competing nations. Thus, POP represents the product of 
the total populations of countries i and j, and GDPpc accounts for GDP per capita distances 
between countries i and j at year t. GEO accounts for the geographical distance between 
countries i and j. The remaining variables, GENE and LANG, measure different distances 
between paired nations. Our model also includes four dummy variables, POLITY, COLONY, 
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ALLIANCE and HOST. To measure the political distance between two competing nations, we 
use a dummy variable with a value of 1 if two nations have the same political ideology (i.e., 
democracy or autocracy) and 0 if otherwise. COLONY is coded as 1 if the competing nations 
were or have been in a colonial relationship since 1945. ALLIANCE is coded as 1 if the paired 
nations have a formal alliance at time t; HOST is coded as 1 if one of the competing nations 
hosts the Olympic Games at time t. All independent variables are logged, except for the dummy 
variables. A year fixed effect is included in the regression and observations are clustered at the 
country–pair level. Detailed description of each variable and its source is listed in Table 2.  
Table 2. Variable descriptions and sources 
 
  
Variable Description Source 
Matched 
frequency 
(weight) 
Competition frequency between 
two countries 
Official IOC Website, IOC 
Olympic Studies Centre 
Logged 
population 
(ln_pop) 
Logged value of product of two 
nations’ total population 
Maddison Project (1952–1988) 
[28],  World Bank Database 
(1992–2015) 
Logged 
geographical 
distance (ln_geo) 
Logged value of simple distance 
between capitals (km) 
CEPII geodistance data 
Database [29] 
Logged GDP per 
capita (ln_gdppc) Logged value of GDP per capita 
Maddison Project (1952–1988), 
World Bank Database (1992–
2015) 
Polity dummy 
(polity) 
1 if pairs share the same type of 
government system  Polity IV Database [30]  
Colonial 
relationship 
dummy (colony) 
1 if pairs were ever in a colonial 
relationship CEPII geodistance data [29] 
Alliance dummy 
(alliance) 
1 if pairs are in formal military 
or strategic alliance 
Correlates of War Project’s 
Formal Alliance (v4.1) [31] 
Logged genetic 
(ln_gene) 
Logged value of weighted FST 
genetic distance 
“Ancestry and Development: 
New Evidence.” [32] 
Logged linguistic 
distance 
(ln_lang) 
Logged value of weighted 
linguistic distance index  
“Ancestry, Language and 
Culture.” [33] 
Host dummy 1 if one of the pairs hosted the Olympic Games in that year Official IOC website 
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3. Results and discussions 
3.1. Community clusters 
 
Fig. 2 presents an example of the MST of the 2016 Olympic Games. We expect to see clustered 
communities in the network, tightly connected links and only a few links formed between 
communities. In Fig. 2, it is difficult to distinguish clustered communities clearly by node 
colour. In Fig. 2A, five different continents, America, Africa, Europe, Asia and Oceania, are 
represented by different colours; Fig. 2B represents democracy levels of the nations; and Figs. 
2C and 2D are coloured in accordance with GDP and population quartiles. In Fig. 2B, yellow 
nodes, which represent very democratic nations, are scattered throughout the network, but not 
clustered. 
As can be seen in Fig. 2, modularity calculations for data in 2016 show that not all values 
exceed the 0.1 level. For other years, the values of modularity Q are similar to those presented 
in Fig. 2. Table 3 shows the results of modularity Q calculations of the post-Cold War period. 
We calculated our modularity Q based on four node attributes as shown in Table 3. Given that 
Figure 2. An MST of 2016 Olympics medal results composed of 86 nodes and 509 links. Node 
attributes are classified as stated in the legend. Each node represents a nation, and competition 
between two nations is represented through links. (A) Nodes are coloured according to the 
continent to which the country belongs (Q = 0.065). (B) Node attributes represent polity, or 
types of government within a given country. Countries are classified into four categories (Q = 
0.035). (C) The GDP of each country is classified into four quartiles (Q = -0.032). (D) The 
population is also classified into four quartiles (Q = -0.037). 
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a modularity value of zero means that all nodes belong to the same community in terms of four 
node attributes, this finding indicates weak community cohesion. 
 
Table 3. Results of modularity Q calculations for the post-Cold War period 
 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Continent 0.08  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.04  0.06  
Democracy -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.03  
GDP -0.01  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.02  -0.03  
Population -0.02  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.02  -0.01  -0.04  
 
Weak community cohesion may result from the fact that Olympic competition 
outcomes represent an aggregate of many factors that influence the Games. However, 
modularity, by definition, only captures community cohesion for one attribute at a time. Thus, 
we employ the gravity model to identify the concurrent factors that influence the results of 
competition between paired nations in the Olympic Games. 
 
3.2. PPML Estimation 
Fig. 3A presents the results of the PPML estimation with corresponding coefficients 
(𝛽) of equation 4 in section 2. Due to direct and indirect geopolitical influences during the Cold 
War period [27-30], we partitioned our dataset into two datasets for the Cold War period and 
Figure 3. Results of the PPML estimation of pairwise Olympic competition (A) and the result of the shuffled data 
(B). Blue square plots represent the results for the entire study period (1952-2016), red diamond plots represent the 
results for the Olympic Games held during the Cold War era (1952-1988), and green circle plots represent the 
Olympics held during the post-Cold War period (1992-2016). Capped spikes mark confidence intervals of 90% and 
other spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. 
A. B. 
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post-Cold War period to facilitate comparison. Explaining the dynamics of the Olympic Games 
cannot be accomplished without consideration of the political factors that characterized the 
Games during the Cold War. For this reason, we partitioned the data into two time periods to 
distinguish between the Olympic Games during the Cold War and the period after the Cold War. 
During the study period (1952–2016), the Wald 𝜒* value is 191.17 (df = 23). Comparing the 
p-value to the alpha level (prob > 𝜒*	= 0.000, two-tailed test), we see that for the Olympic 
Games held during the Cold War era (1952–1988), the Wald 𝜒* value is 130.67 (df = 16) with 
prob > 𝜒* = 0.000. For the post-Cold War period (1992–2016), the Wald 𝜒*value is 129.39 
(df = 15) with prob > 𝜒* = 0.000.  
Our study focuses on pairwise relational characteristics among competing nations. To 
test for potential endogeneity problem, we followed endogeneity test design that are used for 
dyadic data [38]. The idea behind this diagnostic is that when the dyads are randomized, then 
the results of the PPML estimation should lose its significance due to its randomness condition. 
Fig. 3B shows the results of the estimation based on shuffled data. For all three randomized 
results, most of the variables lose statistical significance. This indicates that the results from 
PPML estimations are due to the unique relationship of the Olympic competitions.  
As our results show, compared to the post-Cold War period, values for most of the 
variables during the Cold War era are not statistically significant. This may be because during 
the Cold War era, the medal results at the Olympics were directly affected by major political 
disruptions of the time. Boycotts and disruptions occurred due to political tensions and ongoing 
conflicts. Thus, we can conclude that the athletes participating in the Olympic Games during 
the Cold War period competed under pressure from political circumstances in addition to 
whatever individual challenges they may have faced, which may have affected their 
performances and the competition patterns in the Games. 
When it comes to government type, considerably significant (p-value = 0.052) 
differences in values for the polity variable during the Cold War period indicate that countries 
that competed against one another in the Olympic Games differed politically. In other words, 
democratic nations tended to compete more with autocratic nations, as compared to those with 
same political ideology. However, after the Cold War, the polity variable is no longer significant, 
while the value for the dummy for colonial relationships becomes significant (p-value = 0.034). 
This indicates that in the post-Cold War period, countries tended to compete more often if the 
two competing nations were in a colonial relationship. 
Also noticeable is the host effect of the Olympic Games, which is significant in all 
time periods (p-value = 0.000 for all three estimations). This indicates that if a pair of nations 
includes a host country of that specific Olympic Games, the frequency of competition increased 
in that year. This result is also in line with those in previous studies indicating that hosting 
nations do receive certain advantages[3], [9], [39]. 
GDP per capita is statistically significant overall (p-value = 0.004) during the Cold 
War period (p-value = 0.005) and significant after the Cold War (p-value = 0.016). All three 
estimations show a negative coefficient (total: -0.076, Cold War: -0.153, post-Cold War: -
11 
0.068). As specified in the gravity model, a negative coefficient of distance r indicates less 
distance (i.e., similarity). These results indicate that, over the entire study period, two countries 
that engage more in direct competition tend to be similar in GDP per capita. This not only 
applies to those in the top tiers of the Olympics, but also to those in the bottom tiers. In other 
words, even countries that only won a few medals in total in the Olympic Games tend to have 
competed against nations with similar economic circumstances, rather than competing against 
those with considerable economic differences.  
While other studies acknowledge the importance of the role of GDP per capita in 
performance in the Olympic Games, our relational analysis showed that at the event level at 
the Olympics, countries competed more often against other countries with similar GDP per 
capita. Our analysis shows that at the event level of the Olympic Games, it is not about the size 
of the GDP per capita, but about how similar the competing countries are in terms of GDP per 
capita. Thus, our analysis adds new insight into the economic aspect of the Olympic Games. 
During the Cold War period, genetic distance is not statistically significant (p-value = 
0.346). On the other hand, in the post-Cold War era, genetic distance becomes very significant 
(p-value = 0.002) with a negative coefficient of -0.097. Interpreted as GDP per capita, this 
shows that in the post-Cold War period, countries tend to engage in more competition when 
two nations are similar in genetic origin. 
Figure 4. Similarities in GDP per capita and genetic origin over observed study time. Negative coefficients 
indicate similarities among competing nations. Vertical red dotted line marks the end of the Cold War era. During 
the Cold War era, the coefficient signs fluctuate for both GDP per capita and genetic origin with large confidence 
intervals. Comparatively, after the Cold War, coefficients become negative with less fluctuation in confidence 
intervals. (Error bars= 95% Confidence intervals) 
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In Fig. 4, we graph the results for our two main distances of interest over the 1952–
2016 period. Fig. 4 shows changes in the coefficient over time, with focus on our variables of 
interest, GDP per capita and genetic origin. During the Cold War, coefficients of GDP per capita 
and genetic origin are high in magnitude, while after the Cold War, values for genetic origin 
and GDP per capita are negative and low in magnitude. These results reveal that there is a 
tendency to compete against those who are similar in these two respects.  
 
4. Conclusion 
We applied the gravity model to find similarities between those who engaged in direct 
competition in the Summer Olympic Games since 1952. This study is the first to analyse the 
pairwise relational similarities of competing nations at the individual event level in the Olympic 
Games over time. Our focus shifts away from that of conventional research where the focus is 
on total medal counts. With our different approach, we revealed that those directly engaging in 
competition tended to be similar in GDP per capita and genetic origin.  
Our analysis leads to the interesting conclusion that countries who competed more often at 
the event level tended to be similar in GDP per capita and genetic origin after the Cold War. 
However, during the Cold War period, countries competed against one another when they are 
similar in economic size.  
Our novel approach towards the Olympic competition by applying the gravity model can 
serve as a starting point where the focus of the study is on relational differences or similarities 
among competing nations. Also, we gained new insights to by introducing the notion of masses 
and distances of the gravity model. 
There are limitations to our research due to our holistic approach towards the Olympic 
Games during the time period spanning from 1952 to 2016. In operationalizing our data, we 
only included competing pairs of nations with athletes who won medals. The results of our 
analysis could be improved if the data were extended to include countries with athletes who 
did not win a medal, examining, for example, all the pairwise competing relationships after a 
certain round (e.g., the quarterfinals in a single-elimination tournament). Also, our dataset does 
not take into consideration differences between sports. In future research, it would be 
interesting to observe how distances differ at the sports discipline level. Despite the limitations 
stemming from our method of data operationalization, this study is the first attempt of its kind 
to analyse the characteristics of actual competing pairs within the context of the Olympic 
Games. 
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